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THE COMMITTEE ON ENFORCED 
DISAPPEARANCES AND ITS MONITORING 
PROCEDURES 
RICARDO A SUNGA III∗ 
The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearances establishes the Committee on Enforced 
Disappearances to oversee its implementation. Its reporting, individual 
communications and inter-state communications procedures have enhanced 
features that build on the experiences of other monitoring bodies with 
similar procedures. Its urgent visit and referral procedures contain novel 
elements that can promote compliance with the right not to be subjected to 
enforced disappearance. While issues of duplication, lack of enforcement 
powers, competence ratione temporis and time and resource constraints set 
the parameters of what it can and cannot do, the Committee, as part of a 
system of international and regional bodies, has the potential to induce 
respect for human rights and to help move states toward the goal of 
compliance with the right not to be subjected to enforced disappearance. 
I INTRODUCTION 
This article explores the potential role of the Committee on Enforced 
Disappearances in promoting the objectives of the International Convention 
for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance,1 and in 
fostering respect for the right not to be subjected to enforced disappearance 
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1 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
2006, GA Res 61/177, 20 December 2006, UN Doc A/RES/61/177 (2006), 14 IHRR 582 
(2007), opened for signature 6 February 2007, entered into force 23 December 2010 
(‘Disappearances Convention’). 
152 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 17 NO 1 
that the Convention explicitly guarantees.2 An independent body,3 the 
Committee is the principal organ established by the Convention to oversee its 
implementation.4 
In accordance with the Convention, the Committee comprises 10 experts of 
high moral character and of recognised competence in the field of human 
rights. These Committee members serve in their personal capacity.5 Expected 
to be independent and impartial, members should ‘neither seek nor accept 
instructions from anyone concerning the performance of their duties. 
                                                 
2 Ibid art 1 that states: ‘1. No one shall be subjected to enforced disappearance. 2. No 
exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal 
political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification for 
enforced disappearance.’ According to art 2: ‘For the purposes of this Convention, “enforced 
disappearance” is considered to be the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of 
deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the 
authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the 
deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, 
which place such a person outside the protection of the law.’ 
3 The Working Group that drafted the Convention had debated whether to assign the 
monitoring functions to an existing body, the UN Human Rights Committee, or to establish a 
separate body (Commission on Human Rights, Civil and Political Rights, Including the 
Question of Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances: Report of the Intersessional Open-
ended Working Group to Elaborate a Draft Legally Binding Normative Instrument for the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 59th sess, UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/71 
(12 February 2003) 6). As a compromise, the Committee’s existence is subject to a later 
review at a conference of states parties. Article 27 of the Disappearances Convention states in 
this relation: ‘A Conference of the States Parties will take place at the earliest four years and 
at the latest six years following the entry into force of this Convention to evaluate the 
functioning of the Committee and to decide, in accordance with the procedure described in 
article 44, paragraph 2, whether it is appropriate to transfer to another body — without 
excluding any possibility — the monitoring of this Convention, in accordance with the 
functions defined in articles 28 to 36.’ 
4 Ibid art 26; The first meeting of the states parties to the Disappearances Convention was held 
on 31 May 2011 at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. The meeting elected Mr 
Mohammed Al-Obaidi (Iraq), Mr Mamadou Badio Camara (Senegal), Mr Emmanuel Decaux 
(France), Mr Alvaro Garcé García y Santos (Uruguay), Mr Luciano Hazan (Argentina), Mr 
Rainer Huhle (Germany), Ms Suela Janina, (Albania), Mr Juan José López Ortega (Spain), Mr 
Enoch Mulembe (Zambia), and Mr Kimio Yakushiji (Japan), Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Elections of the Members of the Committee on Enforced 
Disappearances (31 May 2011) <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CED/Pages/ 
Elections2011.aspx>. 
5 Ibid art 26(1). For a critique of similar characteristics in the context of the Human Rights 
Committee, see Makau wa Mutua, ‘Looking Past the Human Rights Committee: An 
Argument for De-Marginalizing Enforcement’ (1998) 4 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 
211, 222. 
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Members are accountable only to the Committee and their own conscience’,6 
and should  
proceed in a victim-oriented and timely manner and maintain the highest 
standards of impartiality and integrity, and apply the standards of the 
Convention equally to all States and all individuals, independently, 
objectively, honourably, faithfully, conscientiously and without prejudice.7 
In determining the Committee’s composition, the Convention does not focus 
as much on the participation of stakeholders as the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities does. That convention goes as far as creating a 
duty to ‘closely consult with and actively involve persons with disabilities, 
including children with disabilities, through their representative organizations’ 
in the nomination process and to consider the ‘participation of experts with 
disabilities’ in the election process.8 But the Disappearances Convention does 
promote the representation of a fair cross-section of the international 
community in the Committee’s composition through its instruction to consider 
‘equitable geographical distribution’ and ‘balanced gender representation’. 
The states parties elect Committee members, taking due account of the 
usefulness of the participation in the work of the Committee of people having 
relevant legal experience.9    
Part II of this article considers the extent to which the monitoring functions of 
this Committee can help strengthen the right not to be subjected to enforced 
disappearance. Part III takes stock of the different issues that the Committee 
faces in the exercise of its monitoring functions. 
II PROCEDURES 
Article 26 of the Disappearances Convention provides that the Committee’s 
mandate is ‘to carry out the functions provided for under this Convention’. 
The Committee’s functions include engaging in: 1) a reporting procedure 
under article 29 of the Convention; 2) the urgent procedure under article 30; 
                                                 
6 United Nations Committee on Enforced Disappearrances, Provisional Rules of Procedure of 
the Committee on Enforced Disappearances, UN Doc CED/C/1/R.1/Rev.1 (27 February 
2012) Rule 10. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Anna Bruce, ‘Negotiating the Monitoring Mechanisms for the Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities’ (2009), in Gudmundur Alfredsson et al (eds), International Human 
Rights Monitoring Mechanisms Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. Möller (Martinus Nijhoff, 2nd 
ed, 2009) 133, 137.  
9 Disappearances Convention art 26(1). 
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3) an individual communications procedure under article 31; 4) an inter-state 
communications procedure under article 32; 5) a visit procedure under article 
33; and 6) a referral procedure under article 34. This Part critically examines 
each of the monitoring functions of the Committee in so far as they bear upon 
the ability of the Committee to promote the right not to be subjected to 
enforced disappearance. 
A Reporting Procedure 
Article 29 obliges each state party to submit to the Committee through the 
Secretary-General of the UN a report on the measures it has taken to give 
effect to its obligations under the Convention. It must do so within two years 
after the Convention’s entry into force for the state party. The Committee will 
consider each report and will issue such comments, observations or 
recommendations as it deems appropriate. This procedure is a vital tool that 
enables the Committee to obtain information about and address a state party’s 
record in the use of enforced disappearances. This reporting procedure in 
article 29 is the only mandatory monitoring mechanism of the Convention. 
Like the reporting procedures of other treaty monitoring bodies, the 
Committee’s reporting procedure will be based on a dialogue.10 Apart from 
the official government reports of the states parties, parallel reports by civil 
society groups and national human rights institutions on the situation in regard 
to enforced disappearances11 will be an important source of supplementary 
information for this dialogue. As Kjaerum asserts, these groups often possess 
knowledge about specific issues of which governments are not sufficiently 
aware or which they prefer to exclude from the official report.12  
Parallel reports are especially useful devices in bringing to light hidden 
practices of enforced disappearance. These parallel reports can cover largely 
the same ground as the government reports, but can provide additional 
information from a much more critical perspective. When these reports are 
accurate, detailed and concise, they can have a major impact on the reporting 
process.13 Since it is in the interest of governments to present facts in the most 
                                                 
10 Morten Kjaerum, ‘State Reports’ (2009), in Alfredsson, above n 8, 17, 22.  
11 They are also called shadow reports or alternative reports.  
12 Kjaerum, above n 10, 22.  
13 Henry J Steiner, Philip Alston and Ryan Goodman, International Human Rights in Context 
Law, Politics, Morals (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2007) 855. 
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favourable light in their reports, other sources of information such as parallel 
reports are an essential aspect of informed monitoring.14     
The reporting system does not relate to particular incidents, but rather the 
situation in general in regard to enforced disappearances. As Boerefijn 
observes in relation to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), the procedure is not of a contentious nature, but aims at a 
constructive dialogue between states parties and the Committee. By means of 
a courteous, systematic and constructive exchange of views, concrete results 
can be achieved.15 In the context of the Convention against Torture, Bank 
points out that the system makes it possible for the Committee to make 
remarks pertaining to diverse aspects of treaty implementation, including 
positive aspects, factors and difficulties impeding the application of the 
Convention, issues of concern, and recommendations.16 In relation to the 
Disappearances Convention, this system enables the Committee to uncover 
patterns in the practice of enforced disappearance and to develop 
comprehensive approaches to address the problem. 
Furthermore, the reporting procedure can serve as an important tool for 
clarifying normative issues and for interpreting and developing the right not to 
be subjected to enforced disappearance. The Committee can address 
normative issues through its ‘Concluding Observations’ comprising country-
specific comments that it can issue as part of its reporting procedure under 
article 29. These ‘Concluding Observations’, that is, specific comments on the 
situations in regard to enforced disappearances in the territories of states that 
have submitted reports, can be an important vehicle for clarifying the text of 
the Convention. As Buergenthal observes of the comparable reporting system 
under the ICCPR, the practice is to adopt Concluding Observations assessing 
                                                 
14 Ineke Boerefijn, ‘Towards a Strong System of Supervision: The Human Rights Committee’s 
Role in Reforming the Reporting Procedure under Article 40 of the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights’ (1995) 17 Human Rights Quarterly 766, 783–4, citing Francesco Capotorti, 
‘The International Measures of Implementation Included in the Covenants on Human Rights’ 
in Asbjorn Eide and August Schou (eds), International Protection of Human Rights: 
Proceedings of the Seventh Nobel Symposium: Oslo 25–27 September 1967 (New York, 
Interscience; Stockholm, Almqvist and Wiksell, 1968) 132–48, 137. 
15 Ibid 772. 
16 Roland Bank, ‘International Efforts to Combat Torture and Inhuman Treatment: Have the 
New Mechanisms Improved Protection?’ (1997) 8 European Journal of International Law 
613, 620. 
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the state’s human rights situation and providing an insight into the manner in 
which the Committee interprets the ICCPR.17 
Not only can the Committee issue Concluding Observations as part of the 
reporting procedure under article 29, but it can also issue a ‘General 
Comment’ that aims to clarify the text of the Disappearances Convention. 
Under its provisional Rules of Procedure, the Committee adopts a General 
Comment ‘with a view to promoting its implementation or to assisting States 
parties in fulfilling their obligations’.18 The power to issue General Comments 
can leave little room for ‘loopholes and disingenuous interpretations’.19 
General Comments of the UN Human Rights Committee today go well 
beyond even the literal text of the ICCPR.20 As Alston observes, the General 
Comment is ‘one of the potentially most significant and influential tools 
available’ to treaty bodies like the Committee.21   
The reactions of states parties to the General Comments of the Committee on 
Enforced Disappearances may vary, as they have to the General Comments of 
other treaty bodies. Alston observes that some governments have claimed that 
certain General Comments are an unwarranted attempt to attribute to treaty 
provisions meanings that they do not have.22 Still, according to the 
International Law Association Committee on International Human Rights 
Law and Practice, courts have generally ‘noted that while treaty bodies are not 
courts, their findings are relevant and useful in some contexts. However, 
courts have usually stopped short of concluding that they are obliged to follow 
treaty body interpretations, even in cases in which the treaty body has 
                                                 
17 Thomas Buergenthal, ‘The Human Rights Committee’ (2001) 5 Max Planck Yearbook of 
United Nations Law 341, 347 cited in Steiner, Alston and Goodman above n 14, 853. 
18 United Nations Committee on Enforced Disappearances, Provisional Rules of Procedure of 
the Committee on Enforced Disappearances, UN Doc CED/C/1/R.1/Rev.1 (27 February 
2012) Rule 54(1). 
19 Antonio Cassese, ‘A New Approach to Human Rights: The European Convention for the 
Prevention of Torture’ (1989) 83 American Journal of International Law 128, 129. 
20 Steiner, Alston and Goodman, above n 14, 884. 
21 Philip Alston, ‘The Historical Origins of the Concept of ‘General Comments’ in Human 
Rights Law’ (2001) in Laurence Boisson De Chazournes and Vera Gowlland-Debbas (eds), 
The International Legal System in Quest of Equity and Universality (Martinus Nijhoff, 2001) 
763.  
22 Ibid 764, citing I Boerefijn, The Reporting Procedure under the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: Practice and Procedures of the Human Rights Committee (1999). Alston 
gives the example of the objection to the UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 
24 that relates to reservations. 
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expressed a view on a specific case or law from the jurisdiction in question’.23 
Nevertheless, Steiner, Alston and Goodman add that UN bodies such as the 
Human Rights Council and the General Assembly, the International Court of 
Justice and regional human rights courts regularly invoke General Comments 
to interpret treaty provisions.24 Mechlem cites the ‘normative significance of 
General Comments for the development of human rights law’.25 
General Comments can mean something similar for the Committee on 
Enforced Disappearances. They can be a comprehensive and coherent way of 
giving more concrete meaning to the text of the Disappearances Convention. 
Through analyses, elaboration and reasoned expounding of norms, these 
General Comments can serve as an important vehicle for making substantial 
arguments and for advancing interpretations of the Convention. 
In addition, the Committee can build on the experience that other treaty 
monitoring bodies have with follow-up procedures. The Convention itself is 
silent on the matter of a procedure to follow up the comments, observations or 
recommendations that the Committee may issue. But, under the Committee’s 
Provisional Rules of Procedure, if it appears that some of a state party’s 
obligations under the Convention have not been discharged or that sufficient 
information has not been provided, the Committee may request this state party 
to provide the Committee with follow-up information to the Committee’s 
concluding observations by a specified date.26 The Committee may also 
‘designate one or more Rapporteurs to follow up with the State party on its 
implementation of the concluding observations’.27 For its part, in accordance 
with rule 71(5) of its rules, the UN Human Rights Committee identifies 
                                                 
23 International Law Association Committee on International Human Rights Law and Practice, 
‘Final Report on the Impact of Findings of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ 
(Berlin Conference 2004) 3, citing Gómez Vásquez v Spain, Communication No 701/1996, 
UN Doc CCPR/C/69/D/701/1996 (16 August 2000); STC (Sentencia Tribunal Constitucional) 
(Spain) 70/2002, 3 April 2002, para 7; Kavanagh v Governor of Mountjoy Prison [2002] 
IESC 13 (1 March 2002) (Supreme Court of Ireland); Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v 
Southern Metropolitan Local Council (2002) 6 BCLR 625 (High Court Witwatersrand, Local 
Division); and Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v Al Masri 
[2003] FCAFC 70 [148]. See also International Law Association Committee on International 
Human Rights Law and Practice, ‘Interim Report on the Relationship between General 
International Law and International Human Rights Law’ (Toronto Conference 2006) 3.  
24 Steiner, Alston and Goodman, above n 14, 885. 
25 Kerstin Mechlem, ‘Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2009) 42 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 905, 929. 
26 Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances, UN Doc 
CED/C/1/R.1/Rev.1 (27 February 2012), Rule 53(1). 
27 Ibid Rule 53(2). 
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priority concerns in its Concluding Observations, on which a state party will 
submit follow-up information within one year, rather than in its next periodic 
report. In accordance with rule 72, the UN Human Rights Committee analyses 
this follow-up information through a special rapporteur appointed for the 
purpose. The Committee against Torture has a similar special rapporteur, 
while the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has 
designated one of its members to follow up on its Concluding Observations.28 
Beyond the initial report due within two years after the entry into force of the 
Convention, the Disappearances Convention does not mention any 
succeeding supplementary reports, unlike the Convention against Torture.29 
But, in accordance with article 29(4), the Committee on Enforced 
Disappearances can request a state party to provide additional information on 
the implementation of the Convention. At the third and fourth drafting 
sessions, the delegates felt it important that the Committee be able to request 
this additional information.30  
Still, there are concerns about the sustainability and duplication of the 
reporting systems of treaty monitoring bodies, including that of the 
Committee on Enforced Disappearances. As Steiner, Alston and Goodman 
point out, the reporting systems are fragmented, complex and under-
resourced, and the overlapping reporting burden and the uncoordinated 
responses of different committees are increasingly being challenged by 
governments.31 The authors cite a report commissioned by the UN General 
Assembly suggesting three long term options for reducing reporting burdens: 
i) reducing the number of treaty bodies and hence the number of reports 
required; ii) encouraging states to produce a single, global report to be 
submitted to all relevant treaty bodies; and iii) replacing the requirement of 
comprehensive periodic reports with specially tailored reports.32 Kjaerum 
emphasises that the treaty body system could have a greater impact on the 
development of human rights if some of the reporting obligations were 
                                                 
28 Marcus Schmidt, ‘Follow-Up Activities by UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies and Special 
Procedures Mechanisms of the Human Rights Council — Recent Developments’ in 
Alfredsson, above n 8, 25, 29. 
29 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 
June 1987) art 19 (‘Convention against Torture’). 
30 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Intersessional Open-ended Working Group to 
elaborate a draft legally binding normative instrument for the protection of all persons from 
enforced disappearance, 61th sess, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/66 (10 March 2005) [30]. 
31 Steiner, Alston and Goodman, above n 13, 921. 
32 Philip Alston, Final Report on Enhancing the Long-Term Effectiveness of the United Nations 
Treaty System, UN Doc E/CN.4/1997/74 (27 March 1996). 
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harmonised and simplified.33 A group of former and current members of 
various treaty bodies have advocated that the different procedures of UN 
treaty bodies should be better coordinated, while each treaty body’s autonomy 
and specific working methods should be respected.34 Such commentary is 
indicative of the ongoing reform process that aims at consolidation and 
unification.35  
The ongoing reform process does not diminish the importance of the 
Committee’s reporting procedure as a monitoring tool. As Niemi and Scheinin 
point out, reporting makes a government accountable for its human rights 
policies before an international body.36 Still, the reporting procedure stands to 
be improved.37 As O’Flaherty points out, citing the ‘Dublin Statement’ made 
by 35 current and past members of treaty bodies, reform is a continuing 
process and not an isolated event. It ought to be the ‘normal state of the treaty 
body system’.38 
B Individual Communications Procedure 
Article 31 enables the Committee to receive and consider communications 
from or on behalf of individuals subject to a state party’s jurisdiction who 
claim to be victims of a violation by this state party of provisions of the 
Convention. The Committee will consider a communication inadmissible 
where:  
 
 
                                                 
33 Kjaerum, above n 11, 23.  
34 Poznan Statement on the Reforms of the UN Human Rights Treaty Body System (Poznan, 
Poland, 28-29 September 2010) [16]. 
35 Michael Bowman, ‘Towards a Unified Treaty Body for Monitoring Compliance with UN 
Human Rights Conventions? Legal Mechanisms for Treaty Reform’ (2007) 7 Human Rights 
Law Review 225, 226.  
36Heli Niemi and Martin Scheinin, Reform of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Body 
System Seen from the Developing Country Perspective (June 2002) Institute for Human 
Rights, Åbo Akademi University, 68 < http://www.abo.fi/media/24259/report12.pdf>. 
37 The limitations on the Committee’s time and resources are discussed in section III of this 
article.  
38 Michael O’Flaherty, ‘Reform of the UN Human Rights Treaty Body System: Locating the 
Dublin Statement’ (2010) 10 Human Rights Law Review 319, 331 quoting Agnes Akosua 
Aidoo et al, The Dublin Statement on the Process of Strengthening of the United Nations 
Treaty Body System (19 November 2009) Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, [11] <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/HRTD/docs/DublinStatement.pdf>. 
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(a) The communication is anonymous;  
(b) The communication constitutes an abuse of the right of submission of 
such communications or is incompatible with the provisions of this 
Convention;  
(c) The same matter is being examined under another procedure of 
international investigation or settlement of the same nature; or where  
(d) All effective available domestic remedies have not been exhausted. This 
rule shall not apply where the application of the remedies is unreasonably 
prolonged.39  
For the purpose of exhaustion of domestic remedies as a condition of 
admissibility, article 31(2)(d) requires exhaustion not of all domestic 
remedies, but of effective domestic remedies only.40  
If the Committee considers that the communication is admissible, it will 
transmit the communication to the state party concerned, requesting that it 
provide observations and comments within a time limit set by the Committee. 
The Committee will hold closed meetings when examining communications. 
It will inform the author of a communication of the responses provided by the 
state party concerned. When the Committee decides to finalise the procedure, 
it will communicate its ‘views’ to the state party and to the author of the 
communication. In authorising the Committee to receive and consider 
communications ‘from or on behalf of individuals,’ article 31(1) leaves open 
the possibility of initiation by NGOs of communications.41  
An individual communications procedure can promote the more effective 
implementation of the explicit guarantee, contained in the Convention, of the 
right not to be subjected to enforced disappearance and can enhance its 
enjoyment. To borrow the words of Byrnes and Connors, this procedure can 
‘provide redress for individual grievances, … stimulate changes in 
discriminatory laws and practices, and … create public awareness’ of the 
right.42 The procedure in article 31 is based on the similar procedures of the 
                                                 
39 Disappearances Convention art 31. 
40 Like article 25(5)(b) of the Convention against Torture, it builds on the experience under 
article 5(b) of the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. 
41 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Intersessional Open-ended Working Group to 
Elaborate a Draft Legally Binding Normative Instrument for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance , 62nd sess, , UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/57 (2 February 2006) 13.  
42 Andrew Byrnes and Jane Connors, ‘Enforcing the Human Rights of Women: A Complaints 
Procedure for the Women’s Convention?’ (1996) 21 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 
679, 699. 
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First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, the Convention against Torture, the 
International Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Their 
Families and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which have made important 
contributions to the implementation of human rights standards.43 
But this individual communications procedure is only optional, in the sense 
that a state has the freedom to accept or reject it. By the terms of article 31 of 
the Convention, a state party needs to accept it by declaring at the time of 
ratification or at any time afterwards that it recognises the Committee’s 
competence to receive and consider communications from or on behalf of 
individuals subject to that state’s jurisdiction and claiming to be victims of a 
violation of provisions of the Convention by that state party. Sokhi takes the 
position that the voluntary nature of the individual communications procedure 
compromises it. Sohki’s concern is that states can refuse the competence of 
the Committee by simply not accepting it.44 Although the optional character 
of the individual complaint system is one of the Protocol’s weaknesses, it is 
unrealistic to expect states to make subjection to the complaint system 
mandatory upon themselves. It remains a question just how many states will 
accept the individual communications procedure in article 31.45  
As with the reporting procedure, the Convention itself does not give any 
direction on follow-up of the Committee’s views. But, under its Provisional 
Rules of Procedure, within six months of the Committee’s transmittal of its 
‘views’ on a communication, a concerned state party is obliged to submit to 
the Committee a written response, including information on any action taken 
in the light of the views and recommendations of the Committee.46 After the 
lapse of this period, the Committee may invite the state party concerned to 
submit further information about any measures which that state party has 
taken in response to its views or recommendations. ‘The Committee shall 
designate a Rapporteur or Working Group for follow-up on Views to ascertain 
                                                 
43 See also Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights opened for signature 24 September 2009 (not yet in force). 
44 Bal Sokhi-Bulley, ‘The Optional Protocol to CEDAW: First Steps’ (2006) 6 Human Rights 
Law Review 143, 157. 
45 As of 24 April 2012, 12 of the 32 States parties have made a declaration recognising the 
competence of the Committee to receive individual communications under article 31. 
46 Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances, UN Doc 
CED/C/1/R.1/Rev.1 (27 February 2012) Rule 77(1). 
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the measures taken by States parties to give effect to the Committee’s Views 
and recommendations.’47  
The Committee has followed the lead of other treaty monitoring bodies in this 
regard. The UN Human Rights Committee has developed its own follow-up 
procedure upon the reasoning that it has the implied powers to do so. 
Accordingly, it has appointed a special rapporteur for follow-up on its views. 
As a matter of practice, it gives 90 days to a state party to provide information 
on measures taken to comply with the recommendations contained in its 
views. If the state party does not provide any, the special rapporteur may send 
a reminder, directly consult with state party representatives or organise a 
follow-up mission. The Committee against Torture, the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Committee on the Elimination 
of Discrimination against Women have developed their own follow-up 
procedures that draw on the experience of the UN Human Rights 
Committee.48  
According to the case law that has arisen out of its individual communications 
procedure, the Committee can not only determine whether there has been a 
violation of the Convention, but it can clarify normative issues and strengthen 
the right not to be subjected to enforced disappearance. Though non-binding, 
the Committee’s views have ‘practical effects’.49 States often respond to these 
views and treat them as a serious matter.50 On the one hand, Nowak goes as 
far as calling treaty bodies like the UN Human Rights Committee ‘quasi-
judicial’ bodies,51 and Scheinin regards the so-called ‘views’ of the UN 
Human Rights Committee (which serve as its decisions on individual 
communications) as authoritative interpretations of the ICCPR.52 On the other 
hand, Steiner has argued that the UN Human Rights Committee cannot 
realistically serve the basic dispute resolution function that informs 
adjudication by courts in many national legal systems; it cannot effectively do 
justice in the individual case within the limits of its jurisdiction and to that 
                                                 
47 Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances, UN Doc 
CED/C/1/R.1/Rev.1 (27 February 2012) Rule 77(4). 
48 Schmidt, above n 29, 25–7. 
49 Robert McCorquodale, ‘The Individual and the International Legal System’ in Malcolm D 
Evans (ed), International Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2006) 307, 318. 
50 Ibid 318. 
51 Nowak and McArthur explain that all inquiries of the Committee against Torture so far have 
been based on information from NGOs. Manfred Nowak, Elizabeth McArthur and Kerstin 
Buchinger, The United Nations Convention against Torture (Oxford University Press, 2008) 
581 referring to the Convention against Torture. 
52 Raija Hanski and Martin Scheinin (eds), Leading Cases of the Human Rights Committee 
(2003) 22, cited in Steiner, Alston and Goodman, above n 14, 915.   
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extent vindicate the rule of law; and it cannot effectively protect rights under 
the ICCPR through deterrence. Steiner believes that ‘[w]hat remains is the 
function of “expounding (elucidating, interpreting and explaining) the 
Covenant so as to engage the UN Human Rights Committee in an ongoing 
fruitful dialogue” with all relevant actors’.53  
Despite the divergent opinions on the exact legal status of the views, their 
utility as vehicles for clarifying normative issues and for developing the 
various aspects of the right not to be subjected to enforced disappearance is 
difficult to dispute. As de Zayas observes in the context of the UN Human 
Rights Committee, though the Committee is not a judicial body, its 
interpretation of the ICCPR has yielded quotable jurisprudence. The 
development of follow-up procedures improves the implementation of its 
views and contributes to the perception that these views are meaningful 
expressions of human rights law.54  
The Committee’s individual communications procedure, through which it has 
the power to grant interim measures, can be a valuable tool to address urgent 
cases of enforced disappearance. At any time after the receipt of a 
communication and before a determination on the merits has been reached, 
the Committee can transmit to the state party concerned, for its urgent 
consideration, a request that the state party take such interim measures as may 
be necessary to avoid possible irreparable damage to the victims of the alleged 
violation. Where the Committee exercises its discretion, this does not imply a 
determination on admissibility or on the merits of the communication.55 The 
Convention thus makes express the practice of other treaty bodies in 
individual communications systems to grant interim measures. 
The Committee on Enforced Disappearances can build on the experiences of 
other treaty bodies with interim measures. Though its Optional Protocol does 
not mention interim measures, the UN Human Rights Committee has issued 
them as a matter of practice in accordance with its rules.56 In OE v S, it had 
requested that an alleged victim who had sought refuge in a country not be 
expelled to another country pending consideration of the case.57 In Altesor v 
                                                 
53 Steiner, Alston and Goodman, above n 14, 916. 
54 Alfred De Zayas, ‘Petitions before the United Nations Treaty Bodies: Focus on the Human 
Rights Committee’s Optional Protocol Procedure’ in Alfredsson, above n 8, 35, 76. 
55 Disappearances Convention, art 31(4). 
56 See Rules of Procedure of the UN Human Rights Committee, UN Doc CCPR/C/3/Rev.10, 11 
January 2012, Rule 92 < http://www.bayefsky.com/getfile.php/id/544/misc/rules>. 
57 OE v S, UN Human Rights Committee, Comm. No. 22/1977, UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/1, 26 
July 1978, 5. 
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Uruguay, it had requested information on the state of health of an alleged 
victim who had reportedly been beaten and subjected to electric shocks during 
detention.58 In Piandiong vs. Philippines, it had occasion to describe its own 
interim measures as essential to its role in its individual communications 
system. In that case, involving a request for a stay of the execution of three 
inmates on death row, the Committee stated that the mechanism should not be 
flouted by irreversible measures.59  
The Committee on Enforced Disappearances may apply this provisional 
remedy of interim measures creatively in a variety of situations, as other 
international bodies have done. The Committee against Torture has similarly 
issued interim measures in accordance with its rules.60 In TPS v Canada, 
acting on an applicant’s allegation of a risk of torture in the event of 
deportation to India, the Committee against Torture had requested that the 
applicant not be deported pending examination of his communication.61 The 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has similarly issued 
interim measures. In International Pen, Constitutional Rights Project, 
Interights on behalf of Ken Saro-Wiwa Jr and Civil Liberties Organisation v 
Nigeria, the African Commission had adopted interim measures requesting a 
stay of the execution by the Nigerian military regime of a writer and activist 
Ken Saro-Wiwa Jr.62 
As they have been for other treaty bodies, interim measures can be central to 
the protective function of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances.63 As 
Pasaluqui observes, the overriding importance of interim measures in human 
rights cases arises from their potential to terminate abuse. The consideration 
of communications can go on for months or even years. Interim measures can 
                                                 
58 Altesor v Uruguay, UN Human Rights Committee, Comm. No. 10/1977, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/15/D/10/1977, 29 March 1982 [2]. 
59 Piandiong v Philippines, UN Human Rights Committee, Comm. No 869/1999, 7 Selected 
Decisions 133 <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/SDecisionsVol7en.pdf> cited 
in Steiner, Alston and Goodman above n 13, 896. 
60 See Committee against Torture, Rules of Procedure , UN Doc CAT/C/3/Rev.5 (21 February 
2011), Rule 114. 
61 Committee against Torture, TPS v Canada, CAT/C/24/D/99/1997 (4 September 2000) 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,CAT,,IND,,3f588ed03,0.html>. 
62African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Int’l Pen v. Nig, Comm. 137/94, 
139/94, 154/96,161/97, 12th ACHPR AAR Annex V (1998-1999) 
<http://www.worldcourts.com/achpr/eng/decisions/1998.10.31_Constitutional_Rights_Project
_v_Nigeria.htm>, cited in Gino Naldo, ‘International Measures in the UN Human Rights 
Committee’ (2004) 53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 445, 450. 
63 Gino Naldo, ‘International Measures in the UN Human Rights Committee’ (2004) 53 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 445, 453. 
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be instrumental in saving lives and avoiding irreparable injury.64 The interim 
measures that the Committee on Enforced Disappearances will be able to 
issue can help put an end to ongoing violations of the provisions of the 
Convention. Pending examination of individual communications that may 
take time to complete, the Committee can act swiftly by adopting the 
appropriate interim measures to avoid possible irreparable damage. 
The individual communications procedure in article 31, with its feature of 
interim measures, is a classic procedure for human rights treaties and is a 
useful complement to the urgent procedure in article 30.65 Unlike the urgent 
procedure (that is confined to locating a disappeared person), the individual 
communications procedure covers breaches of the Convention relating to 
preventive and investigative measures.66 
C Inter-State Communications Procedure  
In accordance with article 32, a state party can declare that it recognises the 
competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications in 
which a state party claims that another state party is not fulfilling its 
obligations under the Convention. There is no provision for interim measures 
in the inter-state communications system. The Committee will not receive 
communications concerning a state party that has not made such a declaration, 
nor communications from a state party that has not made such a declaration.67 
‘The Committee may adopt a report concerning any communication received 
under article 32 of the Convention.’68 
States have yet to realise the importance of this inter-state communications 
procedure. This mechanism received little discussion during the drafting and 
was in fact suggested for inclusion only at the third and fourth drafting 
sessions of the Working Group. It is the weakest monitoring mechanism,69 
                                                 
64 Jo M Pasqualucci, ‘Interim Measures in International Human Rights: Evolution and 
Harmonization’ (2005) 38 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1, 4.  
65 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Intersessional Open-ended Working Group to 
Elaborate a Draft Legally Binding Normative Instrument for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance, 60th sess, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/59 (23 February 2004) 27. 
The urgent procedure is discussed later in this section of the article. 
66 Ibid.  
67 As of 24 April 2012, 13 of the 32 states parties have made a declaration recognising the 
competence of the Committee to receive inter-state communications under article 32. 
68 Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances, UN Doc 
CED/C/1/R.1/Rev.1 (27 February 2012), Rule 85(1). 
69 Nowak and McArthur, above n 51, 701. 
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because it does not seem likely to be used. Similar procedures in other human 
rights treaties have never been used.70  
States parties to the Disappearances Convention are not likely to use this 
procedure. As Leckie points out, a possible reason for the lack of resort to the 
inter-state communications is the perceived political motivation for its use and 
its being potentially damaging and threatening to a state’s interests.71 In 
Schwelb’s words, it is not ‘conducive to friendly relations between states’.72 
For these reasons, those who drafted the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities did not see the importance of providing for such a 
monitoring mechanism. 
Still, the inclusion of this mechanism in the Disappearances Convention adds 
to the range of available remedial options to address enforced disappearances. 
Leckie asserts certain procedural, legal and institutional benefits that can be 
derived from its use and argues that it remains a currently utilised mechanism, 
as evident from its use in other contexts. For example it has been used in a 
case between Tunisia and Libya within the monitoring system of the 
International Labour Organization and a case involving Turkey before the 
Council of Europe.73 However, other than these instances that Leckie cites 
from over 20 years ago, there is little indication of any added value to be 
gained from having the inter-state procedure. 
D Urgent Procedure 
Article 30 enables the Committee to receive urgent requests that a disappeared 
person be sought and found. Relatives of the disappeared person, their legal 
representatives, their counsel, any person authorised by them or any other 
person having a legitimate interest, can submit the request. Article 30 
empowers the Committee to request the state party concerned to provide 
information on the situation of the persons sought, within a time that the 
Committee sets, if the Committee considers that the request for urgent action: 
 
                                                 
70 Ibid. 
71 Scott Leckie, ‘The Inter-state Complaints Procedure in International Human Rights Law: 
Hopeful Prosepects or Wishful Thinking?’ (1987–1988) 10 Human Rights Quarterly 249, 
250. 
72 Egon Schwelb, ‘The International Measures of Implementation of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and of the Optional Protocol’ (1977) 12 Texas International Law 
Journal 141, 161. 
73 Leckie, above n 71, 250. 
2012 COMMITTEE ON ENFORCED DISAPPEARANCES 167 
(a) Is not manifestly unfounded; 
(b) Does not constitute an abuse of the right of submission of such requests; 
(c) Has already been duly presented to the competent bodies of the State 
Party concerned, such as those authorised to undertake investigations, 
where such a possibility exists; 
(d) Is not incompatible with the provisions of the Convention; and 
(e) The same matter is not being examined under another procedure of 
international investigation or settlement of the same nature.  
Based on the information that the state party concerned provides, the 
Committee can transmit recommendations to the state party. These 
recommendations can include a request that the state party take all the 
necessary measures, including interim measures, to locate and protect the 
person concerned in accordance with the Convention and to inform the 
Committee, within a specified period of time, of measures taken, taking into 
account the urgency of the situation. The Committee will then inform the 
person submitting the urgent action request of its recommendations and of the 
information that the state party concerned has provided to it. The Committee 
will continue its efforts to work with the state party concerned for as long as 
the fate of the person sought remains unresolved. The Committee will keep 
the person presenting the request informed. This urgent procedure is not 
subject to an explicit declaration by states parties that they accept the 
competence of the Committee, but they can ‘opt out’ by means of a specific 
reservation.74 
The urgent procedure in article 30 enables the Committee to treat reported 
cases of enforced disappearance as an urgent matter and to address emergency 
situations. It takes into account that any delay in determining the disappeared 
person’s fate can be crucial. It has the potential to resolve a number of issues 
relating to the right not to be subjected to enforced disappearance early on.  
Though the urgent procedure has no precedent in a human rights treaty,75 it is 
actually modeled on existing urgent action procedures. The Working Group 
                                                 
74 Of the 32 states that have ratified the Convention as of 24 April 2012, none have opted out of 
the urgent procedure. 
75 The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination does use an urgent procedure 
but it developed it through its rules. At its 71st session in August 2007 the Committee adopted 
revised guidelines on its Early Warning and Urgent Action Procedure: Report of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 71st sess, A/62/18, Annexes, Chapter 
III.  
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on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances has a similar procedure in which 
its chairperson immediately communicates with a concerned government to 
seek information and cooperation in tracing a disappeared person.76 But the 
Working Group has derived its procedure not from any human rights treaty, 
but from its terms of reference laid down by the Commission on Human 
Rights,77 and now the Human Rights Council. These terms of reference 
include the mandate given to the members of the Working Group ‘to perform 
their functions in an effective and expeditious manner’.78 Rodley has 
described the urgent procedure of the Working Group as perhaps its ‘most 
important and radical technique’.79 The Working Group treats as urgent any 
information reliably suggesting that violations which come within its mandate 
by virtue of their gravity, are in danger of occurring or in the process of 
occurring. The evidence that the Working Group requires is of an arrest by 
public officials, with the detention remaining unacknowledged despite efforts 
to clarify the situation.80  
The Committee similarly takes its cue from the experiences of other bodies 
that have resorted to urgent appeals, such as the Special Rapporteur on 
Torture, the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance, the Working Group 
on Arbitrary Detention, the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression, the 
Special Rapporteur on Racism, the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of 
Judges and Lawyers, the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders, the 
Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism, the Special 
Rapporteur on the Right to Health and the Special Rapporteur on Violence 
against Women.81  
The purpose of the Committee’s own urgent procedure is to allow any person 
with a legitimate interest to request the monitoring body to seek and find a 
disappeared person.82 The urgent procedure assigns responsibility for taking 
                                                 
76 Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, Report of the Working Group 
on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, UN Doc E/CN.4/1435 (1981), 8 and 16. I 
discuss further the establishment of this Working Group and its mandate in the next Part of 
this article. 
77 Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 20 (XXXVI), 1563rd meeting on 29 February 
1980, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/59 (2004), Annex IV, 1.  
78 Ibid. 
79 Nigel Rodley, ‘United Nations Action Procedures against “Disappearances”, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions, and Torture (1986) 8 Human Rights Quarterly 700, 711. 
80 Nigel Rodley, ‘Urgent Action’ in Alfredsson, above n 8, 191, 193. 
81 Ibid 191.  
82 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Intersessional Open-ended Working Group to 
Elaborate a Draft Legally Binding Normative Instrument for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance, 60th sess, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/59 (23 February 2004) 26. 
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preventive action to the Committee. Such a procedure seeks not only to 
forestall enforced disappearances, but also to put an end to those that have 
already occurred.83 The ‘references to the notion of urgency … indicate the 
configuration of the procedure more clearly’.84 Scovazzi and Citroni refer to 
the urgent procedure as an ‘emergency procedure’.85  
The Committee enjoys a measure of discretion to ‘assess situations on a case-
by-case basis’.86 Article 30 makes possible a continuing dialogue between the 
Committee and the state party concerned until the fate of the disappeared 
person is clarified. The Committee will keep applicants informed of the 
replies received from the state party and the action taken in response to their 
applications.87 While this provision requires the notification of competent 
national authorities, the possibility remains for a state to respond to a 
complaint under its domestic law.88 
The urgent procedure in article 30 is distinct from the individual 
communications procedure in article 31. The objective of the urgent 
procedure is to ‘seek, find and afford immediate protection to an individual’,89 
whereas the objective of the individual communications procedure is to 
determine a state’s responsibility for a violation of the provisions of the 
Convention.90 In addition, while the individual communications procedure 
requires a separate declaration at the time of ratification by the state party that 
                                                 
83 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Intersessional Open-ended Working Group to 
Elaborate a Draft Legally Binding Normative Instrument for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance, 61th sess, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/66 (10 March 2005) 31 [126].  
84 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Intersessional Open-ended Working Group to 
Elaborate a Draft Legally Binding Normative Instrument for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance, 62nd sess, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/57 (2 February 2006) 11 
[45]. 
85 Tullio Scovazzi and Gabriella Citroni, The Struggle against Enforced Disappearance and the 
2007 United Nations Convention (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007) 395. 
86 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Intersessional Open-ended Working Group to 
Elaborate a Draft Legally Binding Normative Instrument for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance, 61th sess, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/66 (10 March 2005) 31. 
87 Ibid.  
88 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Intersessional Open-ended Working Group to 
Elaborate a Draft Legally Binding Normative Instrument for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance, 62nd sess, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/57 (2 February 2006) 11. 
89 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the intersessional open-ended working group to 
elaborate a draft legally binding normative instrument for the protection of all persons from 
enforced disappearance, 60th sess, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/59 (23 February 2004) 26 [153]. 
90 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Intersessional Open-ended Working Group to 
Elaborate a Draft Legally Binding Normative Instrument for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance, 60th sess, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/59 (23 February 2004) 26. 
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it recognises the competence of the Committee to receive and consider 
individual communications,91 the urgent procedure has no similar 
requirement. 
Furthermore, while the individual communications procedure is subject to the 
condition of exhaustion of ‘all effective available domestic remedies’,92 the 
urgent procedure only requires that the matter ‘has already been duly 
presented to the competent bodies of the State Party concerned, such as those 
authorized to undertake investigations, where such a possibility exists’.93 But 
both the urgent procedure and individual communications procedure are 
subject to the condition that the ‘same matter is not being examined under 
another procedure of international investigation or settlement of the same 
nature’.94 
The different nature of the urgent procedure explains the lesser conditions for 
its use. Its principal function is to respond immediately to a request that a 
disappeared person be sought and found. The imposition of a number of 
conditions would only slow down the urgent procedure in a way that is 
contrary to its nature and purpose. At the second session of the Working 
Group that drafted the Convention, many participants argued that the urgent 
procedure should not be contingent upon conditions such as the exhaustion of 
domestic remedies.95 
The conditions to which the urgent procedure is subject ought to be kept to a 
minimum in order that it may operate expeditiously in keeping with its nature. 
But, in opposing the urgent procedure, the delegation of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran went in the other direction and proposed the inclusion of an additional 
admissibility criterion requiring the urgent action request to be corroborated 
by the facts. The Working Group appropriately did not accept the proposal 
since the necessary safeguards were already in place.96  
                                                 
91 Disappearances Convention, art 31(1). 
92 Ibid art 31(2)(d). 
93 Ibid art 30(2)(c). 
94 Ibid art 30(2)(e) and art 31(2)(c). 
95 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the intersessional open-ended working group to 
elaborate a draft legally binding normative instrument for the protection of all persons from 
enforced disappearance, 60th sess, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/59 (23 February 2004) 26 [153]. 
96 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Intersessional Open-ended Working Group to 
elaborate a draft legally binding normative instrument for the protection of all persons from 
enforced disappearance, 62nd sess, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/57 (2 February 2006) 11 [46]. 
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If there is any overlap among the provisions, it seems to be between the 
interim measures forming part of the urgent procedure in article 30 and the 
interim measures forming part of the individual communications procedure in 
article 31. Through the urgent procedure in article 30 the Committee is able to 
accommodate requests made with a view not only to preventing the 
disappearance of a person, but also to taking interim protection measures.97 
These interim measures under the urgent procedure are ‘fundamental insofar 
as they involve the immediate adoption of specific measures to protect the 
rights of the persons concerned’.98 Only a slight distinction can be drawn 
between the scope of these interim measures under the urgent procedure and 
those under the individual communications procedure. The latter seem 
broader in scope. Interim measures forming part of the individual 
communications procedure in article 31 aim ‘to avoid possible irreparable 
damage’,99 while interim measures forming part of the urgent procedure in 
article 30 aim more specifically to respond to a ‘request that a disappeared 
person be sought and found’.100 Nonetheless, both kinds of interim measures 
can be useful in providing an immediate response to locate a disappeared 
person.    
The urgent procedure in article 30 provides families with additional means to 
search for their disappeared relatives. As a remedy, it has potential to deliver 
immediate results to victims of enforced disappearance. Shelton states that 
‘[t]he remedial task is to convert law into results, to deter violations and 
restore the moral balance when wrongs are committed’.101 An urgent 
procedure that may gain more visibility than other similar procedures on 
account of its being part of the mandate of a treaty body offers a greater 
possibility of being up to the task.   
E Visit Procedure 
Upon receipt of reliable information indicating a state party’s serious violation 
of the provisions of the Convention, article 33 enables the Committee, after 
                                                 
97 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Intersessional Open-ended Working Group to 
elaborate a draft legally binding normative instrument for the protection of all persons from 
enforced disappearance, 60th sess, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/59 (23 February 2004) 26. 
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99 Disappearances Convention, art 31(4). 
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101 Dinah Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd 
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172 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 17 NO 1 
consultation with the state party concerned, to request one or more of its 
members to undertake a visit and report back to it without delay.102 The 
Committee must notify the state party concerned, in writing, of its intention to 
organise a visit, indicating the composition of the delegation and the purpose 
of the visit. The state party should answer the Committee within a reasonable 
time.  
Upon receiving a substantiated request by the state party, the Committee can 
decide to postpone or cancel its visit. Should the state party agree to the visit, 
the Committee and the state party concerned must work together to define the 
modalities of the visit. The state party should provide the Committee with all 
the facilities needed for the successful completion of the visit. ‘Visits may 
include hearings to enable the designated members of the Committee to 
determine facts or issues relevant to the assessments of the situation.’103 
Following its visit, the Committee must communicate to the state party 
concerned its observations and recommendations. This visit procedure is not 
subject to an explicit declaration by states parties that they will accept the 
competence of the Committee but they can ‘opt out’ by means of a specific 
reservation. 104 
The visit procedure in article 33 enables the Committee to respond to 
systematic violations of the rights that the Convention guarantees. This visit 
procedure is loosely based on the inquiry procedure in article 20 of the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment that may include a visit.105 Both procedures enable 
                                                 
102 Article 33 does not state the purpose of the visit and apparently leaves it to the Committee to 
determine the purpose. 
103 Provisional Rules of Procedure of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances, UN Doc 
CED/C/1/R.1/Rev.1 (27 February 2012) Rule 93(1). See also Rule 97 on related protection 
measures, which provides: ‘Where the Committee receives reliable information that a State 
party has been implicated in reprisals against individuals under its jurisdiction as a 
consequence of providing information or participating in any hearings or meetings in 
connection with a visit, it may request the State party concerned to adopt urgently measures to 
ensure protection of the concerned individuals and submit written explanations or 
clarifications thereon to the Committee.’ 
104 Of the 32 states that have ratified the Convention as of 24 April 2012, none have opted out 
of the visit procedure. 
105 A similar inquiry procedure is provided for in Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, opened for signature 6 October 
1999, 2131 UNTS 83 (entered into force 22 December 2000) arts 8 and 9; and in Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, opened for signature 30 
March 2007, GA Res A/Res/61/106 (entered into force 3 May 2008) arts 6 and 7. The Torture 
Convention itself draws on other models that include the International Labour Organization 
inquiry procedures and the UN Economic and Social Council Resolution 1503 (XLVIII) 
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their respective Committees to receive reliable information from any source 
including NGOs. In relation to past experience with the inquiry procedure, 
Nowak and McArthur observe that the inquiry procedure ‘resembles to some 
extent actio popularis by NGOs’ on account of all inquiries of the Committee 
against Torture so far being based on information from NGOs.106 In relation 
to the inquiry procedure of the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women, Flinterman and Liu state that the inquiry 
procedure is an opportunity for NGOs to address the Committee on alleged 
systematic or grave violations of women’s human rights.107 The visit 
procedure of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances will likely follow 
the same path. 
What sets the two procedures in motion is substantially the same. For the visit 
procedure under the Disappearances Convention, it is ‘reliable information 
indicating that a state party is seriously violating the provisions of this 
Convention’ while for the inquiry procedure under the Convention against 
Torture, it is ‘reliable information which appears to it to contain well-founded 
indications that torture is being systematically practised in the territory of a 
State Party’. In addition, the inquiry procedure involves inviting the 
cooperation of the state party concerned, while the visit procedure similarly 
involves consulting the state party concerned. What Flinterman and Liu have 
said about the inquiry procedure could just as well be said of the visit 
procedure: that it is not a complaint procedure; rather, the Committee has 
complete discretion to initiate the procedure after a determination of reliable 
information of gross or systematic violations, in the case of discrimination 
against women, or of serious violations, in the case of enforced 
disappearance.108  
But while the inquiry procedure is confidential,109 the visit procedure is not. 
Whereas article 20 of the Convention against Torture characterises the inquiry 
procedure as ‘confidential’, article 33 of the Disappearances Convention 
makes no such characterisation of the visit procedure and, in fact, makes it a 
duty of the Committee to communicate to the state party concerned its 
observations and recommendations at the end of a visit. The confidentiality of 
the inquiry procedure, which relies on ‘close cooperation with the government 
                                                                                                                    
(1970) Procedure. See also the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights that has yet to enter into force. 
106 Nowak and McArthur, above n 51, 65.  
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(2009) in Alfredsson, above n 8, 91, 96.  
108 Ibid. 
109 The deliberations, in particular, are confidential. 
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concerned’,110 leads to easier acceptance by states. Nevertheless, the inquiry 
procedure provides for the possibility of the inclusion of a summary account 
in the annual report of the Committee against Torture.111 Such a possibility 
‘constitutes the main tool of pressure on States parties that choose to ignore 
the provisions of the Convention against Torture and practice torture in a 
systematic and widespread manner, or prove to be uncooperative during the 
procedure’.112  
The lack of confidentiality of the visit procedure poses a challenge to the 
Committee on Enforced Disappearances. It must devise ways to cooperate 
closely with states with which it needs to consult,113 to work together with 
them to define the modalities of a visit and to obtain the facilities needed for 
the successful completion of a visit.114 The fact that it may communicate its 
observations and recommendations without restriction115 can serve as an 
important incentive to the Committee on Enforced Disappearances to make 
the most of the visit procedure.  
As a remedy for serious violations of provisions of the Convention, the visit 
procedure may well develop into an important fact-finding tool, like the 
inquiry procedure.116 In Vibhute’s words, it is an innovative procedure for 
effectively preventing enforced disappearances.117 Furthermore, what Sokhi 
has said of the inquiry procedure - that it can contribute to a more detailed 
elaboration of the meaning of the obligations of states parties - can also be 
said of the visit procedure.118 Sørensen adds that the inquiry procedure is 
‘potentially forceful’.119 For her part, Mukherjee states that, although the 
inquiry procedure is time-consuming and relies on the responses of states and 
dialogue, it ‘has developed into an advanced monitoring procedure’ on 
                                                 
110 Nowak and McArthur, above n 51, 662. 
111 Convention against Torture, art 20(5). 
112 Amrita Mukherjee, Torture and the United Nations, Charter and Treaty-Based Monitoring 
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114 Ibid art 33(4). 
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Covenant on Economic, Social and Culture Rights, opened for signature 24 September 2009, 
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Mahon, ‘Progress at the Front: The Draft Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 617. 
117 Khushal Vibhute, ‘The 2007 International Convention against Enforced Disappearance: 
Some Reflections’ (2008) 2 Mizan Law Review 287, 309. 
118 Sokhi-Bulley, above n 45, 157. 
119 Bent Sørensen, ‘CAT and Articles 20 and 22’ (2009) in Alfredsson, above n 8, 99, 100. 
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account of its fact-finding methodology that has produced detailed 
accounts.120  
F Referral Procedure 
Article 34 of the Convention provides for a procedure of urgent referral of a 
matter to the UN General Assembly through the Secretary-General. Upon the 
discovery of well-founded indications that enforced disappearance is being 
practised on a widespread or systematic basis in the territory under the 
jurisdiction of a state party, article 34 enables the Committee to bring the 
matter urgently to the attention of the General Assembly through the 
Secretary-General.121 Before doing so, the Committee must first seek all the 
relevant information on the situation from the state party concerned.122 
Article 34 contemplates a referral to the political bodies of the UN, for which 
some other human rights treaties similarly provide.123 At the third and fourth 
sessions of the Working Group that drafted the Convention, the chairperson 
expressed his view that the referral enabled the Secretary-General to take the 
appropriate action in cases of a widespread and systematic practice of 
enforced disappearance.124 As some delegations observed during the third and 
fourth drafting sessions, the possible consequence of such a referral is the 
transmittal by the Secretary-General of the information to the Security 
Council. The Security Council could then bring a case before the International 
Criminal Court.125 
The referral procedure in article 34 takes into account the urgency and gravity 
of the matter of enforced disappearances. At the fifth drafting session of the 
                                                 
120 Mukherjee, above n 112, 103. 
121 Disappearances Convention art 34.  
122 Ibid. 
123 Other human rights instruments already allow matters to be brought before the political 
bodies of the UN, in particular, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, opened for signature 9 December 1948, 78 UNTS 277 (entered into force 12 
January 1951) art VIII (‘Genocide Convention’); International Convention on the Suppression 
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, opened for signature 30 November 1973, 1015 
UNTS 243 (entered into force 18 July 1976) art VIII (‘Apartheid Convention’); Commission 
on Human Rights, Report of the Intersessional Open-ended Working Group to Elaborate a 
Draft Legally Binding Normative Instrument for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance, 61th sess, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/66 (10 March 2005) 33. 
124 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Intersessional Open-ended Working Group to 
Elaborate a Draft Legally Binding Normative Instrument for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance, 61th sess, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/66 (10 March 2005) 33. 
125 Ibid. 
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Working Group, several delegations observed that the referral procedure was 
important in light of the gravity of the crimes in question and drew attention 
to similar procedures under the Genocide Convention and the Apartheid 
Convention.126 Article 8 of the Genocide Convention enables any contracting 
party to ‘call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such 
action under the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate 
for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide’, while article 8 of the 
Apartheid Convention allows any state party to ‘call upon any competent 
organ of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the 
United Nations as it considers appropriate for the prevention and suppression 
of the crime of apartheid’. The comparable referral procedure in article 34 of 
the Disappearances Convention represents an acknowledgement of the 
serious character of the enforced disappearance that is not unlike that of 
genocide or apartheid. 
Article 34 seeks to generate more comprehensive and coherent action within 
the UN system on the widespread and systematic practice of enforced 
disappearances. Article 34 paves the way for a referral of the urgent matter of 
disappearances to the UN General Assembly through the Secretary-General. 
The Convention thus establishes a link between the inquiry procedure and the 
visit procedure and establishes the possibility of ensuring that conclusions are 
followed up through the Secretary-General.127 
In sum, the Disappearances Convention equips the Committee with a wide 
array of monitoring procedures. On the one hand, the rather large number of 
procedures risks causing confusion through duplication, as with the 
overlapping interim measures under the urgent procedure in article 30 and the 
individual communications procedure in article 31.128 On the other hand, the 
inclusion of practically every possible procedure helps ensure that the 
Committee has a range of options at its disposal to address different kinds of 
issues. For clarifying normative issues, the reporting procedure that is 
mandatory for all states parties to the Convention is a particularly potent tool 
for the Committee. By issuing General Comments or Concluding 
Observations as part of its reporting procedure, the Committee can develop 
the right of a person not to be subjected to enforced disappearance. Through 
                                                 
126 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Intersessional Open-ended Working Group to 
Elaborate a Draft Legally Binding Normative Instrument for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance , 62nd sess, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/57 (2006) 14. 
127 Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Intersessional Open-ended Working Group to 
Elaborate a Draft Legally Binding Normative Instrument for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance, 61th sess, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/66 (10 March 2005) 33. 
128 The next section of this article explores the issue of duplication further. 
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declaring its views in its individual communications procedure (a procedure 
that requires a separate declaration on the part of states parties) the Committee 
can build jurisprudence that further clarifies normative issues.  
Furthermore, the urgent procedure, individual communications procedure and 
inter-state communications procedure offer various forms of protection in 
urgent cases. The urgent procedure is the principal mechanism in emergency 
situations involving requests that a disappeared person be sought and found. 
Interim measures in the individual communications procedure can provide 
complementary protection in urgent cases. The inter-state communications 
procedure may prove useful in cases of a violation committed by a state party 
against another state party.  
Finally, the visit procedure and referral procedure provide important remedial 
options in cases of systematic violations. The visit procedure is a fact-finding 
tool that makes possible visits by members of the Committee to places where 
serious violations of the provisions of the Convention are taking place. The 
referral procedure creates an avenue through which well-founded indications 
of the practice of enforced disappearance on a widespread or systematic basis 
can reach the attention of the UN General Assembly through the Secretary-
General. 
III LIMITATIONS 
It is important to take stock of the limitations imposed on the Committee on 
Enforced Disappearances in order to understand and evaluate its role and 
character. This assessment of the Committee’s potential relies heavily on the 
experience of other international bodies with similar procedures. As with 
these other international bodies, there are constraints on what the Committee 
can do. 
A Lack of Enforcement Powers 
The Committee on Enforced Disappearances, like other international treaty 
monitoring bodies, has no enforcement powers. After all, unlike commercial 
obligations, human rights obligations are generally non-reciprocal. As Cassese 
explains, states are not induced to comply with human rights obligations for 
fear that other states might otherwise feel at liberty to disregard them.129 Even 
when the right to initiate ex post facto adjudication is given to individuals and 
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international bodies and not just states, human rights obligations are not 
expected to compel compliance to the same extent as more reciprocal 
obligations, where the inherent incentives to comply are stronger. The 
prospect of an adverse human rights judgment does not cause as much fear to 
states as the retaliatory threat of economic disadvantage resulting from a 
breach of a commercial treaty.130 Such a limitation has led to calls for reform, 
including a call for a world court of human rights — an international human 
rights body able to establish the facts, decide on alleged violations and, in 
case of violations, provide adequate reparation.131 Since I am drawn to the 
ideal of an international human rights body with enforcement powers, I see 
hope and promise in the call for the establishment of a world court of human 
rights.  
However, in the meantime, mindful of the non-binding character of the 
decisions of treaty monitoring bodies such as the Committee on Enforced 
Disappearances, I suggest that the improvement in their follow-up procedures 
is a significant and encouraging development. Schmidt describes follow-up 
activities as now being at the core of the activities of treaty monitoring bodies. 
He observes a growing realisation that effective follow-up activities provide 
the crucial basis for better and more consistent implementation at the 
domestic level by these bodies. This development of follow-up activities 
translates to a window of opportunity for the Committee on Enforced 
Disappearances. With physical compulsion outside of its competence, the 
challenge is greater for the Committee to build on the experience of other 
treaty monitoring bodies with follow-up procedures and to make creative use 
of its mandate to induce respect for the right not to be subjected to enforced 
disappearance.132  
B Duplication 
It may possibly be alleged that duplication occurs in the work of the 
Committee on Enforced Disappearances both at the international and regional 
levels. It seems that much of what the Committee is mandated to do is already 
being done by other bodies. This issue is particularly pronounced given the 
large number of procedures that the Committee has access to in monitoring 
the implementation of the Convention. 
                                                 
130 Ibid.   
131 Manfred Nowak, ‘Eight Reasons Why We Need a World Court of Human Rights’ (2009), in 
Alfredsson, above n 8, 697.  
132 Schmidt, above n 29, 29. 
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1 International Treaty Bodies 
Several of the Committee’s procedures are already being performed by other 
international treaty monitoring bodies. These other treaty bodies include the 
UN Human Rights Committee and the Committee against Torture.133 Both 
these treaty bodies have a reporting procedure, individual communications 
procedure and inter-state communications procedure like those provided for 
use by the Committee on Enforced Disappearances.134 Furthermore, the 
Committee against Torture has an inquiry procedure that is similar to the visit 
procedure of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances.135 However, as 
Sørensen observes, the inquiry procedure of the Committee against Torture 
concerns only torture,136 and does not concern ‘other forms of cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment’, nor other forms of organised violence 
such as enforced disappearances.137  
The Committee against Torture has found enforced disappearance to be a 
violation of the Convention against Torture. It has stated in its Conclusions 
and Recommendations on the United States: 
The State party should adopt all necessary measures to prohibit and prevent 
enforced disappearance in any territory under its jurisdiction, and prosecute 
and punish perpetrators, as this practice constitutes, per se, a violation of the 
Convention.138 
                                                 
133 The others are the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Committee on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Committee on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women, Committee on the Rights of the Child, Committee 
on Migrant Workers and Committee on Persons with Disabilities. 
134 ICCPR, arts 28, 40 and 41; First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR; and Convention against 
Torture, arts 17, 19, 21 and 22. 
135 Convention against Torture art 20. 
136 According to the Convention against Torture art 1, torture is: any act by which severe pain 
or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such 
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him 
for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of 
any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. 
137 Sørensen, above n 114, 101. 
138 Committee against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against 
Torture: United States of America, 36th sess, UN Doc CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (25 July 2006) [18]. 
For a similar finding that the enforced disappearance is a violation of the Convention against 
Torture, see Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations of the Committee against 
Torture: El Salvador, UN Doc CAT/C/SLV/CO/2 (9 December 2009) 4 and Committee 
against Torture, Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: Syrian Arab 
Republic, 44th sess, UN Doc CAT/C/SYR/CO/1 (25 May 2010) 8.  
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In its consideration of the initial report of Chad, the Committee against 
Torture went further and referred to enforced disappearance as a form of 
torture. It stated: 
The Committee would welcome any statistics that the delegation could 
provide on disappearances, since it regarded any enforced disappearance as 
a form of torture, not only for the abducted person but also for his or her 
family.139 
The UN Human Rights Committee has already given effect to the right not to 
be subjected to enforced disappearance.140  
As an alternative to the multiplicity of treaty bodies that include the 
Committee on Enforced Disappearances, the proposal of a unified standing 
treaty body has been advanced. It is a proposal that fits well with the idea of a 
world court of human rights that is a unified body with enforcement powers. 
Alston summarises the reasons behind the proposal of a unified body as 
follows:   
The following are among the advantages of a unified body suggested by the 
paper: it could adopt a holistic approach; its procedures could be more 
flexible and creative; its relative simplicity would facilitate the work of 
NGOs, national human rights institutions and other stakeholders; the 
interpretation of comparable provisions of different treaties would be 
consistent; General Comments would be consistent and clear; pending 
individual complaints would be adjudicated expeditiously, which would 
make the system more effective and attractive; follow-up capacity would be 
enhanced; it could be flexible in terms of the timing and venue of its 
sessions; it could take on supervision of new treaty standards if necessary; 
and it could work more closely with other human rights bodies, such as the 
special procedures or regional human rights bodies. Perhaps, most 
importantly, it ‘would inevitably be more visible than the existing treaty 
                                                 
139 Committee against Torture, Summary Record of the First Part (Public) of the 870th Meeting, 
42nd sess, UN Doc CAT/C/SR.870 (2009) 8 [49]. For the Concluding Observations on Chad, 
see Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: 
Chad, UN Doc CAT/C/TCD/CO/1 (4 June 2009). 
140 See, for example, Quinteros v Uruguay, UN Human Rights Committee, Communication No 
107/1981, UN Doc CCPR/C/19/D/107/1981, (21 July 1983); and Sarma v Sri Lanka, UN 
Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 950/2000, UN Doc CCPR/C/78/D/950/2000, 
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bodies, and would be able to make its procedures, recommendations and 
decisions better known at the national level.141 
Still, there are those who subscribe to the idea of a system of multiple treaty 
bodies. For instance, Schöpp-Schilling suggests an ‘innovative way of cross-
referencing’ to address the need for consistency in the conclusions of various 
treaty-bodies.142 O’Flaherty understands this ‘cross-referencing’ to mean the 
existence of multiple treaty bodies with greater harmonisation, coordination 
and integration than is taking place at present.143 The advantages of a unified 
treaty body are easy to appreciate. In the meantime, given the present realities 
of a schema of multiple treaty bodies, the Committee on Enforced 
Disappearances ought to take advantage of its unique position as a separate 
treaty body dealing exclusively with enforced disappearances. The Committee 
on Enforced Disappearances should make the most of the opportunity to focus 
its efforts on the complex issues of enforced disappearances and to devote its 
limited time and resources to the objectives of the Convention.  
2 Regional Bodies 
At the regional level, the work of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances 
potentially overlaps with the work of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, the European Court of Human Rights and the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights. Unlike the Committee on Enforced 
Disappearances, the Inter-American Court and European Court, in applying 
the provisions of their respective conventions, are able to render binding 
decisions and award compensatory damages.144 More similar to the 
Committee on Enforced Disappearances in its lack of enforcement powers, 
the African Commission monitors compliance with the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights through its reporting procedure, individual 
communications procedure and inter-state communications procedure.145 
                                                 
141 Steiner, Alston and Goodman above n 13, 923 quoting Concept Paper on the High 
Commissioner’s Proposal for a Unified Standing Treaty Body, UN Doc HRI/MC/2006/2 (22 
March 2006).  
142 Hanna Beate Schöpp-Schilling, ‘Treaty Body Reform: the Case of the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women’ (2007) 7 Human Rights Law Review 201, 
220–1. 
143 O’Flaherty, above n 39, 325. 
144 American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature 22 November 1969, 1144 
UNTS 123 (entered into force 18 July 1978) (American Convention), arts 62 and 63; and 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for 
signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 1953) (European 
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145 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, OAU Doc 
CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5 (1981), reprinted in ILM 58 (1982) (entered into force 21 October 
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These regional bodies are able to make their own contributions to the 
promotion of the right not to be subjected to enforced disappearance. 
Since they are in a position to supplement what the Committee on Enforced 
Disappearances can do, these regional bodies ‘illustrate the full range of the 
human rights movement’s institutional architecture’.146 The Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights have issued 
a range of relevant orders including the payment of compensation to the 
families of the disappeared. The binding decisions of these courts are 
indicative of the innovative institutions and processes possible at the regional 
level.147  
Contributing in their own way to raising the threshold of protection for 
victims of enforced disappearance, regional bodies enjoy a number of 
advantages in implementing rights. The UN General Assembly itself has 
affirmed the importance of regional bodies to promote and protect human 
rights since they ‘are best placed to consider and resolve their own human 
rights situations, while upholding cultures, traditions and histories unique to 
the region’.148 As summarised in a report, the advantages of regional bodies 
include: 
(1) the existence of geographic, historical and cultural bonds among States 
of a particular region; (2) the fact that recommendations of a regional 
organization may meet with less resistance than those of a global body; (3) 
the likelihood that publicity about human rights will be wider and more 
effective; and (4) the fact that there is less possibility of ‘general, 
                                                                                                                    
1986) (African Charter), part 2, chs 2 and 3. A protocol to the Charter establishes the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
146 Steiner, Alston and Goodman, above n 13, 925. 
147 See, for example, Velázquez Rodriguez v Honduras (29 July 1988) Inter-Am Ct H R (Ser C) 
No 4; Bamaca-Velásquez v Guatemala (2000) 70 Inter-Am.Ct.H.R. (ser C); Cyprus v Turkey, 
Application No. 25781/94, III European Court of Human Rights 1 (10 May 2001); and 
Dokayev v Russia, Application No. 16629/05, European Court of Human Rights, (9 April 
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148 Amanda Lloyd, ‘A Theoretical Analysis of the Reality of Children's Rights in Africa: An 
Introduction to the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ (2002) 2 African 
Human Rights Law Journal 11, 14, citing A S Wako, ‘Towards an African Charter on the 
Rights of the Child’ in The Rights of the Child. Selected Proceedings of a Workshop on the 
Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child: An African Perspective Nairobi (1989) 41, and F 
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of the Child’ (1998) 31 Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 199, 
205. 
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compromise formulae’, which in global bodies are more likely to be based 
on considerations of a political nature.149   
But not all regional mechanisms are as likely to promote the right not to be 
subjected to enforced disappearance. It remains to be seen how the revised 
Arab Charter of Human Rights establishing an Arab expert Human Rights 
Committee, the Charter of the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) committing members to the establishment of an ASEAN Human 
Rights Body and the attempts at a human rights mechanism for the Pacific 
will unfold.150 Nonetheless, the global and regional approaches to the 
promotion of the right not to be subjected to enforced disappearance can be 
‘both useful and complementary’.151 
3 Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearances 
The mandate of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances may also need to 
be reconciled with the comparable mandate of the Working Group on 
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances. The former UN Commission on 
Human Rights established this Working Group by Resolution 20 (XXXVI) of 
9 February 1980. It has continued in existence under the UN Human Rights 
Council ‘to examine questions relevant to enforced or involuntary 
disappearance’.152 Its five members serve as experts in their individual 
capacities. They consider reports of disappearances and can take immediate 
action by transmitting reports to governments and inviting them to respond.153 
The duplication between this procedure and the urgent procedure of the 
Committee on Enforced Disappearances has already been noted in this article.  
                                                 
149 Regional Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 28th Report of the Commission to 
Study the Organization of Peace (1980) 15, cited in Steiner, Alston and Goodman, above n 
13, 930. 
150 See Andrea Durbach, Catherine Renshaw and Andrew Byrnes, ‘A Tongue but No Teeth?: 
The Emergence of a Regional Human Rights Mechanism in the Asia Pacific Region’ (2009) 
31 Sydney Law Review 211; and Vitit Muntarborn, ‘Human Rights Monitoring in the Asia-
Pacific Region’ in Alfredsson, above n 8, 641.  
151 ‘Regional Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 28th Report of the Commission to 
Study the Organization of Peace’ (1980) 15, cited in Steiner, Alston and Goodman above n 
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152 Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 20 (XXXVI), 1563rd meeting on 29 February 
1980, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/59 (2004), Annex IV.  
153 For a general discussion on the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary 
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Like the Committee on Enforced Disappearances, the office of the Working 
Group has the mandate of assisting families in determining the fate of 
disappeared relatives by establishing a channel of communication between the 
families and the governments concerned. It continues working on a 
disappearance case until the fate of the disappeared relative is clarified.154 
But the work of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances does not 
necessarily conflict with that of the Working Group on Enforced or 
Involuntary Disappearances. As Switzerland, Argentina, Belgium, Canada, 
Chile, Costa Rica, Ireland, Italy, Mexico and Spain stated at the fifth drafting 
session, the entry into force of the Convention is without prejudice to the 
mandate of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, 
which continues to operate within the framework of its own universal 
mandate.155  
To borrow the terminology used during the third and fourth drafting sessions, 
the relationship between the Committee and the Working Group on Enforced 
and Involuntary Disappearances is one of ‘complementarity’. The mandate of 
the Working Group covers all members of the UN and all disappearances 
since the founding of the UN while the Committee’s mandate is limited to 
parties to the Convention and disappearances after its entry into force. 
Experience in other areas such as torture has demonstrated the usefulness of 
having different bodies working on the same theme.156 
In their own way, these other international and regional bodies have begun to 
address the harms experienced by families of the disappeared. It is on what 
they have achieved that the Committee may need to build, if it is to make its 
own distinctive contribution. These other bodies will carry on with their work 
after the Committee’s establishment. The Committee will establish close 
cooperation with them in accordance with article 28, paragraph 1 of the 
Convention.157 
                                                 
154 Scovazzi and Citroni, above n 85, 247. 
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C Competence Ratione Temporis 
A cause for some concern is article 35 of the Disappearances Convention, 
which limits the competence of the Committee to enforced disappearances 
which ‘commenced’ after the entry into force of the Convention. If a state 
becomes a party to this Convention after its entry into force, the obligations of 
that state vis-à-vis the Committee relates only to enforced disappearances 
‘commencing’ after the entry into force of this Convention for the state 
concerned.  
I question the soundness of this limitation on the competence of the 
Committee. Other human rights treaties impose a lesser limitation. The Rome 
Statute, according to which enforced disappearances are a crime against 
humanity, provides that the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction ‘only 
with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force’ of the Statute.158 
The use of the word ‘committed’ in the Rome Statute instead of the word 
‘commenced’ in the Disappearances Convention leaves open the possibility 
of an exercise of jurisdiction over acts that ‘commenced’ before entry into 
force for as long as they continue to be ‘committed’ after entry into force.  
In imposing a lesser limitation than the Disappearances Convention, the 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities is even more explicit. Article 2(f) of this protocol considers 
individual communications inadmissible if: ‘The facts that are the subject of 
the communication occurred prior to the entry into force of the present 
Protocol for the State Party concerned unless those facts continued after that 
date’. This protocol makes possible the exercise of competence over acts that 
started before entry into force for as long as they continued afterwards. 
The limitation on the competence of the Committee to act in matters of 
enforced disappearances which ‘commenced’ after the entry into force of the 
Convention disregards the nature of the enforced disappearance as a 
continuing violation. The UN Declaration on the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance provides that enforced disappearances ‘shall be 
considered a continuing offence as long as the perpetrators continue to 
conceal the fate and whereabouts of persons who have disappeared and these 
                                                                                                                    
intergovernmental organizations or bodies, as well as with all relevant State institutions, 
agencies or offices working towards the protection of all persons against enforced 
disappearances.’ 
158 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 
2187 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 July 2002) art 11(1). 
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facts remain unclarified’.159 Similarly, the Inter-American Convention on the 
Forced Disappearance of Persons states that the offence of forced 
disappearance ‘shall be deemed continuous or permanent as long as the fate or 
whereabouts of the victim has not been determined’.160 The Working Group 
on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances has stated in relation to the 
enforced disappearance that it is a ‘continuing offence as long as the 
perpetrators continue to conceal the fate and the whereabouts of persons who 
have disappeared and these facts remain unclarified’.161 Article 8 of the 
Disappearances Convention itself acknowledges this continuous nature in 
relation to term limitations.   
The fact that the treaty violation caused by the enforced disappearance 
continues for as long as the whereabouts of the disappeared person are 
unknown, is recognised in the jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights 
Committee. According to the Committee in Sarma v Sri Lanka, although the 
victim’s alleged removal and subsequent disappearance took place before the 
entry into force of the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR for the state 
concerned, the violations of the ICCPR, if confirmed on the merits, might 
have occurred or continued after the entry into force of the Optional 
Protocol.162 For its part, in Velázquez Rodriguez v Honduras, the Inter-
American Court found an enforced disappearance to be a continuous violation 
of many rights under the American Convention.163 In Varnava v Turkey, the 
European Court of Human Rights has also had occasion to give recognition to 
this continuing nature. Rejecting an objection grounded on a lack of temporal 
jurisdiction,164 it has held that, since an enforced disappearance is ‘drawn out 
over time, prolonging the torment of the victim’s relatives’, the ‘ongoing 
                                                 
159 United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance, A/RES/47/133 (18/12/1992) art 17. 
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failure to provide the requisite investigation will be regarded as a continuing 
violation’.165  
There is further support for this continuing nature of the enforced 
disappearance in the jurisprudence of other courts. In Selimovic v Republika 
Srpska, the Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina found the 
applications admissible even if the events in question had taken place before 
the entry into force of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Considering that, seven 
years after the events, none of the applicants had been officially informed 
about the fate and whereabouts of their missing relatives, the Chamber held 
that allegations contained in the applications concerned a continuing violation 
of the applicants’ human rights.166 The Supreme Court of Chile has cited the 
continuing nature of the offence of enforced disappearance as one of its 
grounds for denying the application of an amnesty law and a statute of 
limitation to those responsible for an enforced disappearance.167 
For as long as the truth about a disappearance is unknown — even if it started 
before the entry into force of the Convention — the Committee ought to be 
competent to consider it. Such consideration would not constitute 
retrospective application of the Convention since the violation is ongoing and 
remains current. As the delegations of Argentina, Chile and Italy asserted 
during the drafting sessions, they intend to make an interpretative declaration 
when ratifying the Convention extending the application of certain obligations 
to enforced disappearances commencing even before entry into force for as 
long as the fate of the disappeared person is not clarified.168  
D Limited Time and Resources 
Another problem is that there will be constraints on the time and resources 
available to the Committee on Enforced Disappearances. Quashigah 
establishes a link between budgetary constraints and how effective a treaty 
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body can be.169 Steiner, Alston and Goodman use the following words in 
relation to the UN Human Rights Committee, a body that is subject to similar 
limitations: 
The Committee meets for three sessions annually, each three weeks long, at 
the UN Office in Geneva (twice) and at the UN headquarters in New York. 
There is some intersessional work by individual members in the context of 
Working Groups, which meet for one week prior to the start of each session. 
Living and travel expenses are paid by the UN but since 2002 an annual 
honorarium of $ 3,000 previously paid to members had been reduced to a 
token of $1, in order to save money. The work is part-time, members hold 
‘regular,’ often full-time, jobs, and must fit the Committee’s work into 
already busy schedules.170  
But the experience of other treaty bodies gives the Committee on Enforced 
reason for hope. In so far as the UN Human Rights Committee is concerned, 
in spite of time and resource constraints, it ‘has assumed the character, 
structure and functions that it has’.171 Given its more specific mandate, the 
workload of the Committee on Enforced Disappearances will likely be lighter 
than that of the UN Human Rights Committee. Still, to some extent, the 
Committee on Enforced Disappearances will be subject to similar limitations 
and will need to transcend them if it is to make its own contribution to 
fostering greater respect for the right not to be subjected to enforced 
disappearance.  
By way of summary, there are several limitations to which the Committee is 
subject. Issues of duplication, lack of enforcement powers, competence 
ratione temporis and time and resource constraints set the parameters of what 
the Committee can do. The challenge is for the Committee to work within 
these parameters and make the most out of its role in order to make a 
meaningful contribution to international human rights.  
IV CONCLUSION 
The efficacy of any human rights instrument depends in part on the mandate 
of the body charged with monitoring its implementation by states parties.172 
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With its Convention-given mandate, the Committee on Enforced 
Disappearances has considerable potential to make a distinctive contribution 
to the strengthening of the right not to be subjected to enforced disappearance. 
Its reporting, individual communications and inter-state communications 
procedures have enhanced features that build on the experiences of other 
monitoring bodies with similar procedures. The Committee also introduces a 
number of innovations. Its urgent, visit and referral procedures contain novel 
elements that can promote compliance with the right not to be subjected to 
enforced disappearance. The urgent procedure, which is unprecedented in a 
human rights treaty, seeks not only to forestall enforced disappearances, but 
also to put an end to those that have already occurred. The visit procedure has 
the potential to develop into an important fact-finding tool. The referral 
procedure enables well founded indications of the practice of enforced 
disappearance on a widespread or systematic scale to reach the attention of the 
UN General Assembly through the Secretary-General. As Steiner, Alston and 
Goodman observe, recent treaties such as the Disappearances Convention are 
‘more creative in terms of monitoring arrangements’ than previous treaties 
have been.173  
The establishment of the Committee as a new body to supervise the 
implementation of the Convention better promotes the objectives of the 
Convention than the assignment of new functions to an existing body. A 
separate international treaty-monitoring body able to devote itself exclusively 
to the question of enforced disappearances makes possible a more in-depth 
study of this complex right and enables the development of expertise in this 
area.  
Mindful of time and resource constraints, those who created the new 
international treaty body also made possible swifter action, something that can 
be crucial to saving the lives of disappeared persons. Time is of the essence 
when the right not to be subjected to enforced disappearance is invoked. A 
separate treaty body is better equipped to deal with the exigencies of the 
situation. As Pourgourides points out: 
As regards the need for a rapid intervention mechanism, experience has 
shown that the time factor is crucial. When perpetrators of enforced 
disappearances are faced with rapid reactions from the family, local 
community, or central authorities, sometimes prompted to intervene by 
international bodies, and ideally as long as the ‘chain of known custody’ is 
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173 Steiner, Alston and Goodman, above n 13, 919. 
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not yet interrupted, lives can be saved. Some disappeared persons reappear 
after the perpetrators have realised, or have been made to understand that 
the price – in terms of risk of prosecution or loss of respectability – to be 
paid for definitely ‘disappearing’ the victim is too high. But the existing 
mechanisms are too weak, and in particular, too slow, in order to achieve 
success. A new international instrument on enforced disappearances should 
therefore foresee such a mechanism, perhaps along the lines of that foreseen 
in the first draft of the Inter-American Convention.174  
As part of a system of international and regional bodies, each one contributing 
in its own way to fostering greater respect for the right not to be subjected to 
enforced disappearance, the Committee is a welcome addition to the 
international machinery for raising awareness of the right and discouraging 
violations. 
With its potential to induce respect for human rights and to help move states 
toward the goal of preventing enforced disappearance, the Committee can 
help avoid the ‘paradox of empty promises’ that Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 
warn us about.175 Just as the Convention contributes to the growing legitimacy 
of the right not to be subjected to enforced disappearance, so too the 
Committee can better perform its monitoring functions in a manner that 
induces governments to respect this right. Within the limits of its mandate and 
with the active involvement of NGOs and civil society,176 the Committee can 
play a significant role in determining, both substantively and procedurally, the 
future successof the Convention’s guarantee. It will be up to the Committee to 
transform the Convention into an instrument of change and to help ensure that 
its promise of the right not to be subjected to enforced disappearance becomes 
a reality.  
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